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ABSTRACT
With the aggressive scaling of the VLSI technology, Networks-
on-Chip (NoCs) are becoming more susceptible to faults.
Therefore, designing reliable and efficient NoCs is of signifi-
cant importance. The rerouting approach which is employed
in most of the fault-tolerant methods causes the network
performance to degrade considerably due to taking longer
paths and creating hotspots around the faults. Moreover,
they cannot adapt to the dynamic traffic distribution in the
network. Considering the increasing demands for real-time
systems, the necessity for designing reconfigurable and ro-
bust NoCs is even more pronounced. In this paper, a dynam-
ically reconfigurable technique is proposed to address fault-
tolerance and minimal routing in mesh NoCs. To accomplish
this goal, the router architecture is modified to enable the
frequently communicating nodes to bypass the faulty router
and communicate through shorter paths. Thus, not only
the rerouting is minimized, the connectivity of the network
is maintained in the vicinity of faults. The experimental re-
sults validate the performance and reliability of the proposed
technique with a small hardware overhead.
CCS Concepts
•Computer systems organization → Interconnection
architectures; •Networks→Physical topologies; Net-
work reliability; •Hardware → Network on chip;
Keywords
Network-on-Chip (NoC), fault-tolerant routing methods, min-
imal paths, dynamic reconfiguration, deadlock
1. INTRODUCTION
With the aggressive device scaling in the semiconductor
technology, two salient problems emerge: (1) efficient con-
nection of the increasing number of on-chip resources, and
(2) effective management of the decreasing reliability [1].
The first problem concerns the limitation of the conventional
interconnects which cannot scale well with the complexity
of the chip multiprocessors. The Network-on-Chip (NoC)
paradigm has emerged as a promising solution for such plat-
forms [2]. The second problem arises from the extreme de-
vice scaling which threatens the reliability by low yield and
wear-out. Thus, the interconnect must be able to tolerate
partial failure due to its critical role in holding all of the
components of the system together [1, 3, 4].
The failures are generally classified as either permanent
or transient. Moreover, failures can occur in the switches1
or links connecting the switches. Permanent switch failures
are addressed in this paper.
The incorporation of fault-tolerance into NoC design mainly
revolves around two intertwined concepts: (1) routing method,
and (2) network architecture. While the focus is often slanted
toward the routing methods, the network architecture plays
an equally important role in delivering a reliable system.
Realizing the significance of network connectivity in the
presence of faulty routers, the current research was carried
out to propose a Traffic-Aware Reconfigurable Architecture,
aptly called TARA, for Fault-tolerant 2D mesh NoCs. The
underlying principle of the proposed technique is inspired by
the Minimal-path Connection-retaining Fault-tolerant (Mi-
CoF) approach [4] to maintain the connectivity of a network
by modifying the router architecture. Once a router becomes
faulty, its associated links are normally discarded. However,
by connecting the incoming links of a faulty router to its out-
going links in the desired directions, the packets are able to
bypass the faulty switch and reach the destination through
surviving routers. The main features and contributions of
the proposed technique are:
(1) Unlike the static MiCoF which is oblivious to the traf-
fic distribution, the network topology in TARA is dynam-
ically tailored according to the location of faults and the
current traffic pattern in the network. This is especially
important for the real-time systems since their dynamically
changing requirements can be met effectively and a high per-
formance communication can be achieved. Moreover, the
corner paths can be survived using TARA.
(2) The proposed method supports adaptivity (path diver-
sity) in the network. Furthermore, rerouting is minimized by
sending the packets through the available minimal (short-
est) paths. It does not require routing tables, disable healthy
routers, or set exceptional rules for the borderlines.
(3) TARA uses a purely local fault look-ahead information
which is the minimum knowledge required for making reli-
able routing decisions. Thus, the hardware overhead is kept
to a minimum.
(4) Only one and two Virtual Channels (VCs) [2] along
the X and Y dimensions are required to ensure deadlock-
freedom for a single faulty router. It is livelock-free, as well.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The related
works are studied in Section 2 followed by a description of
MiCoF in Section 3. Section 4 details the mechanism of
TARA. Section 5 is devoted to the simulation results and
discussion. Finally, the conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
1
“switch” and “router” are used interchangeably in this paper.
2. RELATED WORK
Most of the existing fault-tolerant routing methods rely on
detour strategies in order to reroute the packets around the
faulty region [4]. However, rerouting may introduce deadlock
or livelock which can paralyze the network operations. The
methods using detour can be divided into three main groups,
depending on the mechanism they use to create a deadlock-
free path around the fault: some approaches [1, 6] opt for a
more restricted set of path selection heuristics such as the
turn model [2], some [3, 7] use VCs, and some [1, 7, 8, 9]
require off-line reconfiguration of routing tables. Regardless
of the mechanism being used, the detour-based algorithms
suffer from two major drawbacks: (1) The hotspots are more
likely to be created around the faults when rerouting is per-
formed. Furthermore, the aggregated congestion by tak-
ing longer paths degrades the performance, significantly [4].
(2) Strict restrictions on the number and location of faults
do not permit arbitrary fault patterns within the network.
Besides routing algorithms, several studies [8, 4, 3] look
into router design to improve the reliability through microar-
chitectural modifications. For instance, the baseline router is
extended in [4, 3] to bypass the faulty components within the
routers. The mechanism introduced in [3] connects the input
and output router ports directly by adding redundant wires,
called Default Backup Paths (DBPs), to maintain the con-
nectivity of the network in the vicinity of faults. However,
it is difficult to design a deadlock-free routing algorithm for
the resulting irregular topology. The MiCoF approach [4]
combats failures similarly by allocating alternate paths to
bypass the faulty router. The nominal hardware of DBP
and MiCoF is much simpler compared to that of the origi-
nal router datapath. Thus, the packets are transmitted with
shorter latency and lower energy. However, both techniques
are statically hardwired and do not take the traffic scenarios
into account.
Reconfiguration techniques have also been widely used [9,
8] to design resilient NoCs. Most of the fault-tolerant al-
gorithms studied earlier perform route reconfiguration to
bypass faults. In general, reconfiguration solutions require
some extra logic to enable alternative paths. Besides, it
is necessary to avoid the reconfiguration-induced deadlocks
that may occur as a result of transitioning from an old rout-
ing algorithm to a new one while the network is still being
reconfigured [8].
Considering the literature, it is likely that a combination
of different techniques may be required to address fault-
tolerance, given the various fault situations that may occur
in a network.
3. PRELIMINARIES
In order to reduce rerouting and maintain a connected
mesh, Ebrahimi et al. [4] modified the router architecture
to function as a bridge by coupling the horizontal and ver-
tical adjacent routers. As shown in Fig. 1, once the MiCoF
router fails, the East (respectively, West) input channel is
directly connected to the West (resp. East) output channel.
Similarly, the North (resp. South) input is directly linked to
the South (resp. North) output channel [4].
Figure 2(a) presents a 4×4 mesh with five faulty routers.
The resulting network after applying the MiCoF approach
is illustrated in Fig. 2(b). As seen in the figure, the net-
work connectivity is restored by replacing the broken dat-
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Figure 1: The MiCoF router architecture [4].
apaths of routers 6 and 9 with two bypassing paths. The
faulty routers on the border of the network (1 and 11) can
serve merely as horizontal or vertical bridges. The failed cor-
ner router 12 is completely discarded as it cannot assist to
the ne work connectivity according to the MiCoF architec-
ture. As an example, consider the NE-ward packet sent from
source node 4 to the destination node 10. The packet can
bypass the faulty router and reach the destination through
a minimal path (2 hops, shown with the red arrow) without
rerouting.
4. PROPOSED TECHNIQUE
According to [10], the topology determines the ideal per-
formance of the NoC whereas the routing algorithm deter-
mines how much of this potential could be realized. As seen
previously, the only concern in MiCoF is to restore the net-
work connectivity oblivious to the existing traffic pattern.
As a result, the bypassing paths in MiCoF are static and
cannot be changed at run-time. Thus, while some traffic sce-
narios may enjoy the routes provided by MiCoF, the result-
ing topology may put a heavy burden on some other cores.
This can be better explained through an example. Consider
the network in Fig. 2(b) where router 6 is bypassed through
a direct route between 5 and 7. However, this particular
link may be of little benefit if there exists no significant
communication transaction between 5 and 7. Assume that
node 5 is expected to send packets to 10 for a long interval.
The current topology implies rerouting the packets through
a longer (at least 3-hops) path to reach 10. However, it is
of great importance to meet the applications’ requirements
and avoid congestion in a faulty network. To accomplish this
goal, we inherit the core idea of MiCoF and equip that with
reconfiguration logic to provide on-demand minimal (and
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(c)
Figure 2: A 4×4 mesh network (a) with five faulty
routers [4], (b) using the MiCoF approach [4], and
(c) using the proposed TARA technique.
adaptive) routes that match the communication pattern of
the currently running application.
4.1 The Router Architecture of TARA
Figure 3(a) illustrates a faulty router and its four adja-
cent neighbors. Our aim is to enable the possibility of re-
configuration such that not only the network connectivity is
sustained, but also the deficient router can be adjusted to
reduce the the hop count between the high-volume commu-
nicating nodes. As depicted in the figure, the broken router
can be bypassed in three different modes: Mode 1 which
is similar to MiCoF provides straight connections. Mode 2
implies connecting the West neighbor to the South, and the
East neighbor to the North. The connected pairs in Mode 3
are East-South and West-North.
The proposed router architecture is depicted in Fig. 3(b).
As can be seen, we modified the MiCoF switch (Fig. 1) by
adding a Reconfiguration Control Unit (RCU), one 4-to-2
encoder, and larger demultiplexers and multiplexers at the
input and output ports plus the required wiring. Similar
to MiCoF, the routers employ a Built-In Self-Test (BIST)
mechanism to evaluate their internal components. Once a
failure is detected in a router, the Fault signal is activated.
The functionality of the TARA switch is explained as fol-
lows. Consider the same example discussed earlier with the
initial state as Fig. 2(a) where a heavy communication flow
is created from node 5 to 10. However, switch 6 is broken
and needs to be bypassed according to Mode 3. Thus, node 5
makes a complaint to the RCU of node 6 about the unavail-
able EN route whenever it tries to transmit packets. The
RCU of node 6 collects all of the complaints from its neigh-
bors, evaluates the requirements, and eventually determines
which mode is suitable for the current network state. The
RCU has one output port for each bypassing mode (labeled
as M1, M2, and M3). Depending on the mode chosen by
RCU, only one output signal has the value of 1, while the
rest are 0. Together with Fault, the RCU output signals
are connected to the inputs of the encoder. The truth table
of the encoder is also illustrated in Fig. 3(b). As depicted
in the figure, two bits are required to configure the TARA
router to operate in four different modes (i.e. original data-
path, M1, M2, and M3). Thus, the outputs of the encoder
are connected to the select lines of the demultiplexers and
multiplexers allowing the desired physical route to be es-
tablished. For instance, if Mode 3 is eventually selected by
RCU, a new bitstream (“11”) is generated at the output of
the encoder such that the East input port will be directed
to the North, West to the South, North to the East, and
South to the West.
Once a failure occurs, the proposed reconfigurable archi-
tecture adjusts the affected paths dynamically to reduce net-
work blocking while restoring the connectivity. Therefore,
the network may have different topologies at different times
depending on the communication patterns. For instance, the
network in Fig. 2(c) fulfills heavy communication demands
between the 5-13, 5-10, 0-2, 2-7, and 10-15 pairs. Moreover,
unlike MiCoF, TARA can always rescue the corner routes.
Note that bypassing multiple adjacent faulty routers may
create long links that may decrease the clock frequency since
the flits cannot pass through them during a single cycle. To
solve this problem, we can borrow the idea of [11] where
registers (1-flit buffers) are inserted along the alternative
links such that the flits can be latched after each cycle.
4.2 The Routing Algorithm of TARA
In order to avoid traversing unnecessary longer paths, each
router needs to know about the fault status of its surround-
ing neighbors (i.e. fault information). In TARA, we assume
that each router is equipped with a 1-hop look-ahead fault
information, similar to MiCoF.
Fault scenarios degrade the regular NoCs to irregular (ar-
bitrary) topologies. Thus, most of the designers resort to
topology-agnostic routing algorithms such as Up*/Down*
which rely on lookup tables to ensure the deadlock-freedom.
These schemes suffer from two major drawbacks [12]: (1) The
cost of the lookup tables (in terms of silicon area and power
consumption) badly affects the scalability of the algorithm;
(2) Heavy computation is required to maintain the correct
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(b)
Figure 3: (a) Bypassing a faulty router in three different modes. (b) The proposed router architecture.
routing paths in the network.
In order to avoid costly routing tables, the TARA routing
algorithm is designed upon the Dynamic XY (DyXY) rout-
ing algorithm [13] where the packet is adaptively sent to the
X or Y direction depending on the congestion condition. In
order to ensure deadlock-freedom, one and two VCs are uti-
lized along the X and Y dimensions, respectively. Further
details about DyXY can be found in [4].
TARA is capable of tolerating any single faulty switch
with 100% reliability while ensuring the deadlock-freedom.
Figures 4(a) and (b) illustrate the cases where a northeast-
ward packet detects a broken switch using the look-ahead in-
formation and the destination node, D, is one hop away from
the current node, C, along both X and Y dimensions. As
discussed previously, the faulty switch may be configured in
three different modes which are illustrated under the original
state. If the switch operates in Mode 1 or Mode 2, using the
bypassing routes implies a non-minimal path to the destina-
tion. Thus, the packet takes the 2-hop NE path (Fig. 4(a))
or the EN path (Fig. 4(b)) to reach the destination. In
Mode 3, the packet simply takes the direct minimal path to
reach the destination. To ensure the consistency with the
DyXY routing algorithm, bypassing the paths formed by
Mode 2 or Mode 3 in TARA is treated as taking turns from
X to Y dimension and vice versa. Note that a turn involves
a 90-degree change of the traveling direction.
Figures 4(c)-(j) show all of the cases for a northeast-ward
packet where the distance between C and D is one or two
hops along the X and Y dimensions. Depending on the by-
passing mode, the packets are forwarded through different
paths as depicted in the figures. Finally, Fig. 4(k) and (l)
show the routing policy of TARA for an east- and north-
ward packet, respectively. As can be seen, TARA prefers
to transmit the packets through the minimal paths. More-
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Figure 4: Tolerating single faulty switch using TARA when the destination is located on the (a)-(j) northeast,
(k) east, and (l) or h of he current node. The faulty switch which cannot be detected by the look-ahead
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over, it is adaptive and takes the congestion condition of the
receiving routers into account whenever multiple paths are
available. Since the number of reroute operations is limited
in TARA, it is livelock-free as well.
When the distance from C to D is two hops or more along
both dimensions, C forwards the packet to the healthy out-
put channel. If both of the neighbors are healthy, the less
congested neighbor is selected to send the packet. Besides
northeast, routing the packets in other directions is per-
formed in a similar fashion and is not discussed here because
of the limited space.
4.3 Reconfiguration Issues
4.3.1 Reconfiguration Mechanism
In order to keep the complexity of RCU as low as possible,
TARA utilizes a simple reconfiguration methodology which
is performed as follows:
Step 1. We define reconfiguration time frame windows (Rw)
during which the requests from the neighbors are collected.
Three counters collect the statistics for each bypassing mode.
Once the Fault signal is activated, the control mechanism
of RCU is triggered such that the corresponding counter is
updated for each complaint. At the end of the Rw, the coun-
ters are compared using a majority gate to determine which
mode has the highest demand and the output bitstream is
generated by RCU. Rw equals 100 cycles in this paper.
Step 2. Once a pattern change is observed, the faulty
router configures itself to a new bypassing mode that best
suits the traffic pattern of the current application.
4.3.2 Deadlock-freedom
Techniques employing dynamic reconfiguration [14, 8] have
to pay a special attention to the reconfiguration-induced dead-
lock in addition to the routing-induced deadlock. Since we
use a single deadlock-free routing algorithm (i.e. DyXY)
which does not change during the topology reconfiguration,
reconfiguration-induced deadlock cannot occur.
4.3.3 In-flight Packets
In order to avoid lost and dropped flits in a connected
network, we need to make sure that each packet sits entirely
in one switch along the route that is affected by the recon-
figuration. Thus, before switching to a new topology, the
following conditions should hold:
1) The Routing Unit (RU) of the upstream router should
be temporarily halted to stop sending packets to the output
ports. The reason is that the reconfiguration affects the
inter-router connections and the output port assigned to a
given packet may not be valid for the new bypassing mode.
2) The flits which have passed the RU, should successfully
follow the remaining stages and leave the upstream router.
3) The reception of the tail flit of the in-flight packets
should be acknowledged by the downstream router.
5. SIMULATION RESULTS
For appraising the efficiency of TARA, simulations were
conducted for an 8×8 mesh using the BookSim 2.0 cycle-
based network simulator [2]. The data width is assumed as
32 bits and each input channel has a buffer size of 16 flits.
The congestion threshold is set to 62.5% of the buffer capac-
ity, and the packet size is uniformly distributed between 5
and 10 flits. After the warm-up period, the results were aver-
aged over 200,000 cycles. TARA was implemented using the
universal Logic-Based Distributed Routing (uLBDR) [15]
due to its efficiency to support irregular topologies. TARA
was compared with MiCoF as the most closely relevant tech-
nique. We assumed that the reconfiguration takes two extra
cycles, one cycle for making a decision and another cycle for
configuring the router in the desired mode.
5.1 Performance Analysis
5.1.1 Synthetic Traffic
The average latency curves of TARA and MiCoF as a
function of the network’s message injection rate are plotted
in Fig. 5, for different number of switch failures (indicated
in the parentheses) under the uniform and hotspot traffic
patterns. The faulty nodes were selected using a random
function to ensure a fair comparison.
As shown by simulations, employing MiCoF results in a
lower average latency compared to TARA under the uniform
traffic. This is due to the reconfiguration strategy in TARA
where the bypassing mode is selected according to the traffic
history. In fact, this kind of reconfiguration is mostly wrong
under the uniform traffic pattern. For instance, consider
an interval where data is sent to the SW direction. TARA
will configure the topology to provide direct access to that
direction. However, SW has the lowest possibility to carry
high traffic loads in the next interval, based on the uniform
traffic model [14]. Therefore, the configuration in TARA is
counterproductive and escalates the latency experienced by
the packets. On the contrary, MiCoF which provides static
routing paths oblivious to the underlying traffic flows, can
achieve better performance under the uniform traffic.
For the hotspot traffic which represents a more realistic
traffic model, four hotspot nodes at the center of the net-
work were selected with an extra 25% traffic. Under the
hotspot traffic, utilizing TARA results in a lower average
latency compared to MiCoF. This can be explained by con-
sidering the fact that there exists a consistent traffic flow in
the network such that the reconfiguration remains effective
throughout the simulation. Thus, TARA is able to outper-
form the static MiCoF in tackling the congested areas by
providing customized minimal paths at the occurrence of
fault, and thereby reducing the average communication de-
lay. Compared to TARA, the performance of MiCoF drops
significantly because of the fixed paths that the packets have
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Figure 5: Performance comparison of an 8×8 mesh
under uniform (left) and hotspot (right) traffic.
to follow to reach the destinations without considering the
traffic flows. Moreover, both MiCoF and TARA provide
better latency results as the number of failures increases in
the network. The reason is bypassing the pipeline of the
original datapath which can be translated into smaller hop
count and faster transmission in the network.
5.1.2 Trace-driven Traffic
For a more realistic traffic analysis, we carried out the
trace-driven simulations from SPLASH-2 benchmarks across
an 8×8 NoC with 3 switch failures, which is configured with
20 processors and 44 shared L2 cache memory modules. Fig-
ure 6 shows the average packet latency across five bench-
marks, normalized to MiCoF. TARA provides lower latency
than MiCoF and it shows the greatest performance gain for
cholesky with 22% reduction in latency. The average perfor-
mance gain of TARA across all benchmarks is up to 16%.
5.2 Reliability Analysis
In order to assess the reliability of TARA, the number of
faulty routers was increased from 1 to 10 under the uniform
traffic profile. The reliability is measured as [4]:
No. of successful packet arrivals at the destination nodes
Total no. of delivered packets
The results are shown in Fig. 7. As can be seen, both
methods are 100% reliable when there is a single faulty
router in the network. TARA can tolerate up to ten faulty
routers by more than 99.99% reliability whereas the reliabil-
ity of MiCoF is around 76%. Note that MiCoF can tolerate
multiple number of faulty switches in the network provided
that they are not located in the diagonal positions [4].
5.3 Area Analysis
To assess the hardware cost of TARA, the routers were
modeled with VHDL and synthesized by Synopsys Design
Compiler using the TSMC 32nm standard cell library. Both
routers use 2 VCs along the Y dimension. Compared with
the MiCoF router, TARA increases the area by 24% which is
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der the uniform traffic.
mainly due to the reconfiguration circuitry. Assuming that
the router area occupies 11% area of a tile as reported by
Intel [14], the increase in the tile area using TARA will be
around 2.6% which can be considered negligible.
6. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a dynamically reconfigurable architec-
ture (TARA) for wormhole-switched 2D mesh NoCs. The
main advantages of TARA over the conventional schemes
is its ability to dynamically tailor the failed switch to the
current traffic pattern such that not only the connectivity
of the network is maintained, but also the performance can
be improved. Moreover, TARA supports adaptive, fully dis-
tributed, minimal, and algorithmic routing without using
routing tables.
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